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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

vs.

Appellate Court No. 20060069-CA
ANTHONY ANGELO LUCERO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Possession of a
Controlled Substance in a Jail or Prison, a second-degree felony in violation of
U.C.A. §58-37-8(2)(e) (2003).

A jury found the Defendant guilty on

December 13, 2005. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
WERE THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
UNDER
THE
FOURTH
AMENDMENT
TO
THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES VIOLATED
WHEN THE OFFICER DETAINED THE DEFENDANT
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Since the Defendant did not properly

preserve this issue for appeal, this Court should apply the plain error standard.
"To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur,
(2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is
harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, 57 P.3d 1139 | 41 (See also
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) and State v. Olsen,
860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). However, when the claimed error is one
involving a constitutional right a higher standard under the third prong of this
test is applied. In the case of State v. Hackford, 131 P.2d 200, 204, (Utah
1987) the court held:
[W]here the error in question amounts to a violation of a
defendant's right of confrontation guaranteed by the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution, its harmfulness is
to be judged by a higher standard, i.e., reversal is required unless
the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis
added, see also State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995))
which applied the standard to any constitutional question)
POINT II
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED MAKE
A MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED
AFTER AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Appellate Court must determine as a
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which
was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine
whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable. Id at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
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accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section 1
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article 1, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
Article 1, Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§58-37-8 (2)(e). Prohibited acts -- Penalties.
(2) Prohibited acts B ~ Penalties:
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined
in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be
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sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b),
and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and
not concurrently.
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with one count of
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, and one count of
Possession of a Controlled Substance in jail or prison, a second-degree felony.
(R. 001-02)

A preliminary hearing was scheduled for July 28, 2005.

The

Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing and pled not guilty. (R.
013) A jury found the Defendant guilty of the second-degree felony possession
in a jail and not guilty of the third-degree felony possession of a controlled
substance on December 13, 2005. (R. 070) The Defendant was sentenced on
January 19, 2006, to serve an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the
5

Utah State Prison. (R. 084) On February 8, 2006, the Defendant filed a notice
of appeal. (R. 092)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 9, 2005, Officer Jonathan Hill and Officer Derek Draper were
working in an area in lower Ogden that they believed was a high crime area.
(R. 112 /59) At 5:30 that morning they observed a vehicle drive up to a house
that they were watching for drug activity. The car pulled in for a few minutes
and then left, raising the officer's concerns about drug trafficking. (R. 112/ 60)
Both officers conceded that they were unable to see the vehicle for the five
minutes it was at the house. Officer Hill followed the vehicle and pulled it
over for failing to signal a full 3 seconds before changing lanes. After he pulled
the vehicle over, he also discovered that the car had a loud muffler. (R. 112 /
61,84-87)
The car was occupied by four individuals, including the Defendant. The
officer noticed that a back seat passenger, who he suspected might have been
under age 21, appeared to be intoxicated, and noticed the Defendant
unsuccessfully attempt to fasten his seat belt. (R. 112 / 63) The officer checked
the driver's information and decided to release the driver with a warning on the
muffler. Before he released the driver, he began asking questions of the underaged individual in the back seat. The individual told him that "You don't need
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to know". (R. 112/ 90) The officer ordered the individual from the vehicle and
ultimately arrested the minor for illegal consumption of alcohol. (R. 112 / 66,
96)
Apparently at that time the Defendant was also outside of the vehicle
being questioned by Officer Draper. (R. 112/ 113) Officer Hill told the driver
that she was free to leave, but at that time Officer Draper was still talking with
the Defendant. (R. 112 / 113) Officer Hill then began asking the driver
questions about guns and drugs in the car. (R. 112 / 100) He then asked the
driver if she minded if he searched the car. (R. 112/ 66) The driver consented,
and the Defendant informed her that she had a right to require that the police
get a warrant to search the car. R. 112 / 66
Officer Draper testified that the Defendant then "put his hands in the air
and said, 'search me.'" (R. 112 / 158) Officer Draper found nothing in that
search. The officers went ahead and searched the car and found a baggie of
methamphetamine under the seat where the Defendant was sitting. (R. 112/ 67,
70) Officer Hill asked the Defendant if the baggie was his, to which the
Defendant responded no. Officer Hill asked the Defendant if he had used meth
recently and he responded that he had used two hours earlier. (R. 112 / 123)
Officer Draper testified that the Defendant told him that the baggie would have
all of the car occupants' fingerprints on it. (R. 112/149)
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Officer Draper transported the Defendant to jail where he was search by
a correctional officer who found a baggie of methamphetamine in the front
pants pocket of the Defendant. (R. 112 / 151) This search was videotaped and
was played to the jury. (R. 112 / 168) The Defendant claimed that the
contraband was planted on him. (R. 112/162)
The Defendant took the stand and testified that Officer Draper when he
asked him to get out of the vehicle that the defendant said, "Do I have to?"
Officer Draper waited a few seconds and then said, "I ain't got all day/' after
which the Defendant complied with his request. (R. 112/ 184) Officer Draper
conducted a thorough search and then placed him under arrest for the
contraband that was found in the car. (R. 112/ 185) At the jail the correctional
officer found a baggie of methamphetamine in the Defendant's front coin
pocket. The defendant testified that he believed that Officer Draper planted the
drugs on him. (R. 112/187)
At the end of the trial, the defense counsel moved the court to dismiss
the case against the Defendant. The trial court denied the motion. (R. 112/215,
216)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case revolves around the seminal question of whether or not the
Defendant's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution were violated. The Defendant did not properly preserve this
issue, and therefore the issue must be decided under the plain error standard.
In this case, the Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that the police were
watching in a high drug crime neighborhood. The officers decided to follow
the car and wait until a traffic offense occurred and then conduct further
investigation.
The officer followed the car until it failed to signal a full three seconds
prior to a turn. The car was then pulled over and the driver was given a citation
for the petty traffic offense. The officer, together with another officer who
followed and arrived shortly thereafter began a fishing expedition in search of
drugs. The officers observed an individual in the back seat that appeared to be
intoxicated and under age and ordered him from the car. The Defendant was
also asked to get out of the car, to which request he ultimately assented. After
the officer searched the Defendant's person and found nothing, the driver and
the Defendant were further detained while the officers continued to ask if the
driver if he could search the vehicle. The consent search revealed some
controlled substance in the back seat, and the Defendant was arrested.
It is this extensive detention and eventual request for search that violated
the Defendant's Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. The subsequent
drugs found on the Defendant at the jail should therefore have been suppressed.
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Due to the fact that defense counsel failed to recognize and object to this
Fourth Amendment violation, counsel was ineffective, and therefore the
Defendant's constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel was also
violated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES WERE VIOLATED WFIEN THE
OFFICER DETAINED THE DEFENDANT BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides
in relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated." The Courts on both the state and federal level have defined when a
seizure is unreasonable.
The Supreme Court in the case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) held:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee,
274 U. S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.
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The general rule regarding warrantless searches was established in the
case of Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) in which the Supreme Court set forth a
three-prong test in determining whether an individual is seized and what type
of search is permitted under various types of seizures.
In the recent case of State v. Hansen 2002 UT 463 U 34 63 P.3d 650, the
Utah Supreme Court defined once again its' long-standing position on
permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the Court defined these levels as
follows:
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to
non-coercive questioning by an officer. Id. Since the encounter is
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is
no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Royer,
460 U.S. at 498-99.
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive. United States v.
Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Werking,
915 F.2d at 1407 (noting a level two encounter is an investigative
detention or "Terry stop"). Although it is a Fourth Amendment
seizure, probable cause is not required. Evans, 937 F.2d at 1537.
Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and rational
inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or
is committing a crime," an officer may initiate an investigative
detention without consent. Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407.
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been
"characterized [as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that]
requires probable cause." Id. A level three encounter is also a
Fourth Amendment seizure. Id.
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In State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 643 63 P.3d 650, the Utah Supreme Court
was presented with a set of facts that is almost identical to the case at hand. In
that case the defendant was legally stopped for an initial traffic offense. After
the officer had verified his license and registration, the officer asked the
defendant if he could search the vehicle for alcohol drugs or weapons. The
defendant allowed the search and then appealed that search to the Utah
Supreme Court. The court stated:
In this case, after Officer Huntington verified Hansen's license
and registration and completed a computer check, the purpose for
the initial traffic stop was concluded. Yet, Officer Huntington
extended the encounter by questioning Hansen about whether he
had alcohol, drugs, or weapons in his vehicle and by asking if he
could search his vehicle for these items. Officer Huntington
conceded he had no reasonable suspicion of a further illegality to
justify the additional questioning. Rather, he engaged in such
questioning as a matter of practice. Since the scope of questioning
exceeded, without justification, the purpose of the initial traffic
stop, the continued encounter was illegal unless some other
circumstance justified the additional questioning. (Id. at f 32)
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals reversal of the
defendant's conviction on the grounds that the defendant's consent to search
"resulted from exploitation of the prior police illegality." (Id. at ^[ 70) The
Court ruled that a defendant's consent to search that is a direct result of an
illegal detention violates the defendant's 4th Amendment constitutional rights.
The Utah Court of Appeal in the case of State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT
App 434, 37 P.3d 260, reversed a defendant's conviction where he was stopped
12

in a public bank based upon a tip from an unloiown informant that the
defendant had committed a forgery. The defendant was arrested and a search
revealed a controlled substance. This Court determined that a reasonable
officer under the circumstances could not have had reasonable suspicion to
believe that the defendant had committed an offense therefore the seizure was
unconstitutional.
In further defining when a stop crosses the line from level-one to leveltwo, this Court in the case of State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) stated:
The distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely
consensual encounter) and a level-two encounter (a seizure
requiring reasonable suspicion) depends on whether, through a
show of physical force or authority, a person believes his
freedom of movement is restrained. See United States v.
Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64
L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).
In the case of State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 470 68 P.3d 1052, this
Court was presented with a case where the police officers were executing an
arrest warrant on an individual. That individual requested that the officers
allow her to go into her bedroom to put on some weather appropriate clothing.
The officers accompanied the individual into her bedroom, at which point they
discovered a male individual (the defendant) lying on the bed with his hands
obscured from the officers view. The officers, in an attempt to insure their
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safety, woke the individual, discovered that he had nothing in his hand, and yet
proceeded to request his identification.

The defendant originally told the

officers that he did not have any identification, and then, when asked,
proceeded to give the officers a false name. Upon discovering that the false
name and been given, the officers arrested the defendant; and in a search
incident to arrest, discovered methamphetamine. The trial court suppressed all
the evidence, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that suppression with a
holding as follows:
The trial court found, and we are not presented with a factual
basis to disturb its finding, that nothing supported the officers'
investigation into Valdez's identity during the detention. The trial
court further found that no articulable facts existed to support a
reasonable suspicion that Valdez was involved in any criminal
activity. Therefore, Robinson's request for
Valdez's
identification, or, absent that, information concerning his identity,
exceeded the scope of the reason justifying the initial detention
and unnecessarily expanded its duration and scope. Thus, we
conclude that the trial court correctly suppressed any evidence
gathered from that point forward. (Id, at ^f 21)
In the case at bar, there is no question that the officer had a right pull
over the vehicle in which the Defendant was a passenger for failing to signal
for a full three seconds before turning1.

1

Two questionable occurrences occur

Defendant is cognizant of the pretext stop doctrine allowing such a stop as
defined in State v. Lopez, 873 p.2d 1127,1134 (Utah 1994)
14

thereafter, however. First, after the officer arrested the passenger on a warrant,
the officer continued to detain the driver while he asked for permission to
search the vehicle. Second, the officer asked the Defendant to get out of the
vehicle, and then commenced to ask him questions about drug usage. There is
no reasonable articulable suspicion that the Defendant had anything in the
vehicle at that point in time that would justify such a detention. There is no
question that this constituted a seizure of the Defendant under a level two
detention.
Taken as a whole, the totality of the above-stated information could not
possibly constitute reasonable suspicion. The fact that the officer thereafter
detained the Defendant violated the Defendant's

Fourth Amendment

constitutional rights. Pursuant to state and federal case law, anything search
thereafter would be in violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure. Once that line was crossed, no quantum of
evidence can thereafter retroactively cure this violation.
Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally
impermissible seizure of the Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does
this constitutional violation affect the subsequent evidence? In the case of
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court
stated, "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical,
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tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful
invasion." The Court further reinforced the gravity of Fourth Amendment
protections by stating,
In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional
guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the
person, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, this Court held
nearly half a century ago that evidence seized during an
unlawful search could not constitute proof against the victim of
the search. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383. The
exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the
direct products of such invasions. {Wong Sun v. United States, at
484)
The Utah Appellate Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine. In the case of State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505
(Utah App. 1998) this Court held:
Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us
to exclude "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct.
at 1691. There is no dispute that the stop of defendant at the
Tibbie Fork Canyon traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor
is there any dispute that, absent the good faith exception, all
evidence obtained subsequent to defendant's stop should be
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441
(1963).
In the case at bar, there is no question that the officers impermissibly
seized the Defendant when the officer detained the Defendant and driver while
asking for consent to search.

Once that seizure occurred, any evidence

obtained should be suppressed as a violation of the Defendant's constitutional
16

rights, under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In the present case, that
suppression should include all evidence concerning the Defendant's possession
of illegal drugs later found at the jail.
The problem in this case is that this evidence was admitted in trial
without any objection by defense counsel, and therefore a Defendant on appeal
is required to establish plain error. "To establish plain error, a defendant must
show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to
the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348
(See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and State v.
Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). However, when the claimed error is
One involving a constitutional right a higher standard under the third prong of
this test is applied. In the case of State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204, (Utah
1987) the court held:
[Wjhere the error in question amounts to a violation of a
defendant's right of confrontation guaranteed by the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution, its harmfulness is
to be judged by a higher standard, i.e., reversal is required unless
the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, (emphasis
added, see also State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995)
which applied this standard to any constitutional question)
In the present case there is no question that an error occurred, due to the
fact that the Defendant was detained long beyond the scope of the traffic stop.
Even if one were to argue that the officer had probable cause to detain, for
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identification purposes, the under-age-21 passenger who was intoxicated, the
seizure of the driver and the Defendant went on long beyond the time
necessary to effectuate the arrest of the offender. The officer, after completing
that arrest then asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle and searched and
questioned the Defendant. The officers further continued to detain the driver
and ask if they could search the vehicle.
The fact that the officers admitted to asking permission to search the
vehicle is a clear indication that the search was a permissive search, rather than
one incident to arrest. Furthermore, asking that the Defendant leave the vehicle
was an additional intrusion of the Defendant's constitutional rights without any
justification.
Once the Defendant has established that an error has occurred, he must
then show that the error should have been obvious to the trial court and that the
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the error should have been obvious to the trial court,
due to the nature of the stop and the obvious illegal extension well beyond the
scope of the stop. It is interesting in this case that the officer conceded that he
followed the car in question until he could find a petty traffic violation which
would marginally allow a constitutional stop. It is obvious that the officer was
conducting a fishing expedition, hoping for any excuse to search the vehicle.
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This assessment is bolstered by the fact that the officer additionally mentioned
the fact that upon stopping the vehicle and getting out of his car he notices that
the muffler is too loud. The officer admitted that he ticketed the driver only for
the three-second violation and that he did not intend to arrest her on that
citation. (R. 112/87)
Finally, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If this
Court finds that the Defendant's constitutional rights were violated, the result
would be the suppression of the evidence and ultimate dismissal of the charge
for lack of evidence.

POINT II
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO
MOVE THE COURT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
OBTAINED AFTER AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF THE
DEFENDANT.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's
assistance was ineffective.

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's
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performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at
687, 80L.Ed.2dat693.
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, 411 U.S. 365 (1986), the Court
was presented with a case almost identical to the case at bar where defense
counsel, due to a failure to conduct proper discovery, did not timely file a
motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment.

The Court of

Appeals reversed his conviction under an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.

The Supreme Court affimied that reversal.

In that affirmation of

reversal the Court stated:
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness,
the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence
in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. {Kimmelman v.
Moirrison, 411 U.S. 365, 375 (1986))
In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to comport with
constitutional requirements the Court held:
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct
pretrial discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only
implausible explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while
generally creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for
this apparent and pervasive failure to "make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
20

particular investigations unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under
these circumstances, although the failure of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall performance
was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional
assistance in the respects alleged. {Kimmehnan v. Morrrison, All
U.S. 365,386(1986))
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this
Court found that the failure of trial counsel to object to a Fourth Amendment
violation constituted error, as well as established reversible

ineffective

assistance of counsel. In that case, the Court applied the Strickland test to a
situation where defense counsel had in a pretrial motion moved to suppress
evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The trial court denied that motion
based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing. During trial the officer altered
his testimony establishing the lack of plain view, yet trial counsel did not reraise the motion to suppress. The Court held that "where a defendant can show
that there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient
actions, the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v.
Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993))
Defense counsel's error in the present case was glaringly obvious to any
observer. His failure to object to and have a hearing on the illegal seizure
discussed more fully in Point I above clearly showed a deficiency. In
Kimmehnan v. Morrison infra., the court found reversible error in a case where
21

trial counsel realized a Fourth Amendment issue, but brought it to the court's
attention in an untimely manner. That untimely motion alone constituted
reversible error. In State v. Gallegos infra., the court found error in trial
counsel's failure to renew a previously denied motion to suppress. In the
present case, counsel, as in Kimmelman failed to make a timely motion to
suppress a Fourth Amendment violation.

However, unlike counsel in

Kimmelman or in Gallegos, trial counsel in the case at bar was so deficient that
he never even recognized that a Fourth Amendment question was at issue.
Furthermore, "Counsel's performance at trial. . . suggests no better
explanation for this apparent and pervasive failure." {Kimmelman) To the
contrary, there is absolutely no conceivable reason for defense counsel not to
make a pre-trial motion to suppress this evidence. Since this motion should
have been brought prior to trial, even the possible fear of somehow prejudicing
the jury would be non-existent. Even if defense counsel could be excused for
failure to bring a pre-trial motion, upon hearing the evidence, counsel could
have requested an in camera hearing asking for the evidence to be suppressed
during the course of the proceedings. There simply was no reason defense
counsel failed to make this motion. There was "no conceivable legitimate
tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions." (Id. State v. Snyder at 359)

??

The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary
to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second
part of the Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."

{Id. at

187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making
the determination that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should
"consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as
whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect
and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id.
Likewise, in the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 981 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998), the court found prejudicial error in failing to object to the
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admission of a tin canister that contained drugs, which was found during an
illegal search. In that case the court held: "Because the evidence found in the
tin was essential to the State's case on [drug possession] charges, admission of
that evidence was obviously prejudicial to defendant."
In the present case, the error by defense counsel encompasses the "entire
evidentiary picture". If trial counsel had raised the illegal seizure issue, and if
the trial court had correctly ruled on that issue, all of the evidence obtained
after such violation would have been suppressed. In this case, that means the
entirety of the evidence that supported Defendant's conviction. These claims
have been fully argued in Point I above.
When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence
in the outcome of the trial.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing the trial court committed plain error in failing to
recognize the obvious violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment
constitutional rights. This failure resulted in the admission of evidence that
should have been suppressed. The Defendant was also deprived of effective
assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the State and Federal constitutions due
to trial counsel's failure to recognize and raise the Fourth Amendment
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violations. The defendant therefore respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the Defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial without the evidence
that should have been suppressed.
DATED this/^Tday of May 2006.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 051903321 FS

ANTHONY ANGELO LUCERO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PARLEY R. BALDWIN
January 19, 2 0 06

PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: CRAIG JOHNSON
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RYAN BUSHELL, PDA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 25, 1981
Video
Tape Number:
BO1190 6
Tape Count: 10:19

CHARGES
2.

POSS C/S WITH IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - 2 n d D e g r e e F e l o n y
P l e a : Not G u i l t y
- Disposition: 12/13/2005 G u i l t y

HEARING
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in custody
and is represented by Ryan Bushell, public defender. Defendant
addresses the court.
Court acknowledges receipt of a written Notice of Appeal filed pro
se by the defendant and accepts this notice as of today after the
sentencing is imposed.
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Case No. 051903321
Date
Jan 19, 2006

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS C/S WITH IN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years m the Utah State Prison
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends credit for any time served in the Weber County
Jail .
/

Dated this

/ Q day of

^$1?^

/T\o

Q £> .

SEYRTM
PARLEY
R. BALDWIN
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)

